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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WEST VALLEY CITY,
Appellate Court No.: 960465 CA
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Priority No. : 15

RANDY BURTON,
Defendant/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final judgment of a misdemeanor
case.

Therefore, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah

Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether the trial court should be affirmed on appeal because

the appellant has failed to marshal the evidence and provide this
court with an adequate record for review on appeal.
II.

Whether the officer exceeded the scope of the investigation

by putting his head into the appellee's vehicle for the purpose
of smelling the appellee's breath.
III. Whether there was sufficient evidence prior to the illegal
search to justify the officer changing the scope of the
investigation from that of a headlight violation to that of an
investigation of driving under the influence of alcohol.

IV.

Whether the investigation of driving under the influence of

alcohol which occurred after the illegal search was sufficiently
attenuated from the prior illegality to justify its
admissibility.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
As to the argument that the appellant has failed to marshal
the evidence this Court has stated that when the "record before
us is incomplete, we are unable to review the evidence as a whole
and must therefore presume that the verdict was supported by
admissible and competent evidence." Sampson v. Richinsr 770 P.2d
998, 1002 (Utah App. 1989).

As to the substantive arguments on

the motion to suppress this Court will not disturb a trial
court's factual determinations unless such findings are deemed
clearly erroneous.

State v. Taylorf 818 P.2d 561, 565 (Utah App.

1991); State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 208 (Utah App. 1991).
However, a trial court's conclusions of law which arise from its
factual findings are reviewed for correctness and afforded no
deference.

State v. Rawlingsf 829 P.2d 150, 152 (Utah App.

1992) .

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44 (1953 as amended)
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 15, 1996, at about 12:01 a.m., Officer Schmidt
of the West Valley City Police Department saw the appellee's car
traveling westbound on 3500 South without its headlights on.
officer was headed Eastbound on the same street.
7-8).

The

(Transcript at

Schmidt did a U-turn to stop the appellee and turned his

top lights on.

(Transcript at 8). Other than the headlight

violation, there was no reason to stop the appellee.1

Based on

the fact that the appellee was driving without his headlights on,
and nothing more, the officer formed a hunch that the appellee
was driving under the influence.

(Transcript at 2 6)

The officer approached the driver's window and requested the
appellee's driver's license, registration and insurance.
(Transcript at 11).
officer's request.

The appellee responded "Yeah" to the
(Transcript at 17-18).

The officer put his

nose and face inside the window as soon as he finished asking for
the appellee's license and registration.

(Transcript at 18).

The officer then pulled his head back and nodded in affirmation
that he smelled alcohol to the ride-a-long passenger in his
patrol car because he had discussed this previously with his
passenger.

(Transcript at 18-19).

The officer put his nose

inside the passenger compartment to see if he could smell the

1

Officer Schmidt testified that the car drifted just a bit
across the right line, however, he later testified that he did
not recall if the car pulled right over as it went across the
line and he also did not recall if the car went back onto the
roadway after it had gone across the white line. (Transcript at
9).

3

odor of alcohol.

(Transcript at 12).

When the officer stuck his

head inside the vehicle he could smell the odor of alcohol.
(Transcript at 13).

Prior to that time the officer did not

notice any slurred speech from the appellee.

(Transcript at 18).

Other than the appellee traveling without his headlights on and
the alleged odor of alcohol, the were no other factors indicating
that the appellee had been drinking or that he was under the
influence of alcohol.2

The officer proceeded to put his head

2

The trial court found that Officer Schmidt smelled the
odor of alcohol when he had a conversation with Mr. Burton.
(Transcript at 27). Officer Schmidt testified that he could
smell the odor of alcohol when he went up to the car.
(Transcript at 10) However, this testimony is highly suspect.
First of all the officer testified that he did not recall if the
window was up or down when he approached. (Transcript at 10) .
Secondly, the officer also testified that the appellee spoke with
him several times and after speaking with him for a while, he
could smell the odor of alcohol.
Q
Okay, did you at any point stick your head a little
closer to the window?
A
Yes. I did.
Q
When did you do that?
A
After speaking with Mr. Burton for a brief moment, he
was reaching for his driver's license, registration and
insurance, I believe which was in his glove box.
Q
Okay. You did have a chance to speak with him then?
A
Oh, yeah.
Q
And did he turn and speak with you while your head was
still outside the vehicle?
A
Yeah. He—he spoke to me several times.
Q
Okay. Did you—when he turned and spoke to you, were
you able to ascertain if it was coming from him or not?
A
Yeah. That's—that's what made me believe that he had
been drinking while driving—
Q
Okay.
A
—'cause I could smell the alcohol coming from his
breath.
Q
Okay. Now, you did at one time stick your head in the
window a little bit?
A
Could have been partially in there, yes.
Q
Okay. When did you do that?

4

inside the passenger compartment of the vehicle three or four
more times.
The appellant, at the close of the hearing, indicated that
the record of the hearing was not going to be very clear with
regards to the video tape and its contents.

(Transcript at 40).

The appellant went on to tell the trial court that if the
appellant decided to appeal, that the attorney for the appellant
would contact the attorney for the appellee and agree upon the
facts as contained on the video and have those facts made part of
the trial court's order.

Id.

The appellant never contacted the

attorney for the appellee with regards to its intention of
appealing this case or with regards to clarifying the record with
a written order.

A
After speaking with him for awhile, I could smell the
odor of alcohol, I just wanted to make sure the odor of alcohol
was coming from the car and not on the street or anything right
by there, because it is a heavily traveled road, a lot of
pedestrian traffic and sometimes—
(Transcript at 11-12). Based on the foregoing testimony, the
officer was not sure if what he smelled was coming from within or
without the vehicle. The officer went on to testify that before
he put his head in the window he had told the appellee that he
could smell alcohol and that in response to that the appellee
told the officer he had been drinking. (Transcript at 15).
The only conversation between the appellee and the officer prior
to the officer sticking his nose and then his head in the window
was the officers's request for the appellee's driver's license,
registration and insurance and the appellee's response of "Yeah."
(Transcript at 17-18). The officer is basing his prior testimony
of his smelling the odor of alcohol on a faulty recollection of
the appellee speaking with him several times, which conversations
never occurred.

5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ON APPEAL BECAUSE THE
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE AND PROVIDE
THIS COURT WITH AN ADEQUATE RECORD FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL.

The appellant has the duty to provide this court with all
the evidence and papers necessary for review of the case.

Rule

11 of the Utah Rules of App. Pro. The appellant has failed to
marshal the evidence.

The lower court did not make findings of

fact nor conclusions of law, and the record is incomplete.

Where

the record before this Court is incomplete, this Court has held
that it will presume the validity of the verdict.

Sampson v.

RJChing, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah App. 1989).

II.

THE OFFICER EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION BY
PERFORMING AN ILLEGAL SEARCH BY PUTTING HIS HEAD INTO THE
APPELLEE'S VEHICLE FOR THE PURPOSE OF SMELLING THE
APPELLEE'S BREATH.

The appellee was legitimately stopped for driving without
his headlights on. After the stop, the officer exceeded the
scope of the stop for the headlight violation by putting his head
inside the passenger compartment of the appellee's vehicle. The
officer put his head inside the vehicle to search for the odor of
alcohol.

This search of the passenger compartment of the

appellee's vehicle was not supported by probable cause and went
beyond the scope of the initial detention.

6

III.

THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRIOR TO THE ILLEGAL
SEARCH TO JUSTIFY THE OFFICER CHANGING THE SCOPE OF THE
INVESTIGATION FROM THAT OF A HEADLIGHT VIOLATION TO THAT
OF AN INVESTIGATION OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE.

The only evidence that the officer had available to him
prior to the search was the headlight violation.

After the stop,

the officer testified that the appellee turned and spoke to him
several times and during that conversation with the appellee, the
officer smelled the odor of alcohol. However, after reviewing
the video, the officer admitted that the only conversation
between him and the appellee before the search was the request by
the officer for the appellee's driver license, registration and
insurance information, and the appellee's single word response of
"Yeah." The evidence available to the officer at the time that
he conducted the search was insufficient to merit the intrusion.

IV. THE INVESTIGATION OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
ALCOHOL WHICH OCCURRED AFTER THE ILLEGAL SEARCH WAS
NOT SUFFICIENTLY ATTENUATED FROM THE PRIOR ILLEGALITY TO
JUSTIFY ITS ADMISSIBILITY.
All the evidence acquired after the illegal search was the
fruit of the illegal search and the appellant has failed to
produce any evidence showing any attenuation between the illegal
search and the subsequently discovered evidence.

7

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ON APPEAL BECAUSE
THE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE AND
PROVIDE THIS COURT WITH AN ADEQUATE RECORD FOR REVIEW
ON APPEAL.

Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires
that the appellant provide this Court with all evidence and
papers necessary for appropriate review.
responsibility of the appealing party.
Appellate Procedure.

This is the

See Rule 11 Utah Rules of

In this case the appellant agreed to sit

down with counsel for the appellee and prepare some findings of
facts with regards to the contents of a video shown at the
hearing on the motion to suppress.

(Transcript at 40).

This was

never done and the record currently before this Court is
therefore confusing and incomplete.
Furthermore, the lower court did not make findings of facts
and conclusions of law.

The City, who wished to appeal, did not

obtain from, nor prepare for the trial court, findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
review by this Court.

These are necessary for appropriate

The trial judge, Carlos Esqueda, was a

Judge Pro Tern, and is no longer on the bench, thus further
complicating this matter currently before this Court.

The City's

failure to marshal the evidence on this appeal should result in
this Court ruling in the appellee's favor.
In State v. Rawlings, 829 P.2d 150 (Utah App. 1992), the
Utah Court of Appeals ruled that because of the inadequate record
provided by the appellant to the Appeals Court, the Court could

8

not address the issues raised and would therefore presume
correctness of the disposition made by the trial court.

In

another case, Sampson v. Richins. 770 P.2d 998 (Utah App. 1989),
this Court stated that "Rule 11 directs counsel to provide this
court with all evidence relevant to the issues raised on appeal".
Id. at 1002. The Court further went on to say "[w]here the
record before us is incomplete, we are unable to review the
evidence as a whole and must therefore presume that the verdict
was supported by admissible and competent evidence." Id.
Findings of fact are necessary to clearly indicate the mind of
the court and resolve issues of material fact necessary to
justify the conclusions of law and judgment entered thereon.

See

Parks v. Zions First Nat's Bankr 673 P.2d 590, 601 (Utah 1983).
It is the appealing party's responsibility to marshal the papers
necessary to proceed with an appeal.3
Appellate Procedure.

See Rule 11 Utah Rules of

In this case this was not done by the

appellant and the Court should uphold the lower courts decision.
In State v. Genovesif 871 P.2d 547 (Utah App. 1994), this
Court held that a trial court must make detailed findings of fact
and conclusions of law for adequate review on appeal.

The result

in Genovesif was a remand4 for entry of findings of fact and
3

In Horton v. Gem State Mut. of Utahf the Court said that
the appellant has the burden of providing the court with an
adequate record to preserve its arguments for review. 794 P.2d
847, 849 (Utah App. 1990).
4

The appellee in this case is not requesting remand,
instead, the Appellee is requesting that the court rule in its
favor because the appellant failed to marshal the evidence, or
9

conclusions of law.

Id. at 552.

In this case the trial court

judge made limited findings of fact and conclusions of law,
supporting his decision.5

The problem is that the appellant was

going to prepare additional findings of facts for the trial
judge's signature.

These findings were never prepared.

Because

of that failure by the appellant to adequately marshal the
evidence the appellee requests that the Court affirm the lower
court's decision.

II.

THE OFFICER EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION BY
PERFORMING AN ILLEGAL SEARCH BY PUTTING HIS HEAD INTO
THE APPELLEE'S VEHICLE FOR THE PURPOSE OF SMELLING THE
APPELLEE'S BREATH.

The Appellant raises the scope issue by arguing the two
prong approach in State v. Lopez.

873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994).

The Appellant argues that the search of the interior of the
appellee's vehicle for the odor of alcohol was justified under
the second prong which states that a detention must be reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances that justified the
interference in the first place.

The appellee does not contend

that the stop of his vehicle was unlawful.

The appellee was

stopped for not having his headlights on at night after having

because after a review of the record and the transcript of the
hearing on the motion to suppress, and the judges limited
findings and conclusions, the court is convinced that the ruling
is correct.
5

A remand in this case would create difficulties and
unfairness to the appellee because, as previously discussed, the
trial court judge is no longer on the bench.

10

been observed by Officer Schmidt of the West Valley City Police
Department.
However, the search of the interior of the appellee's
vehicle for the odor of alcohol went beyond the scope of a
headlight violation.6

Lopez holds that "[i]nvestigative

questioning that further detains the driver must be supported by
reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity."
1132.

Id. at

If the questioning of a driver with regards to a crime

outside the purpose of the initial detention must be supported by
reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity, then a
search of the interior of the vehicle must be supported by even
more because it is a much greater intrusion.
The Appellant tries to justify this intrusion upon the
appellee's right to privacy of what is contained within his
automobile by using language that was written with the intent of
minimizing the intrusive nature of investigatory stops.

The

Appellant correctly argues that an officer must "diligently
[pursue] a means of investigation that [is] likely to confirm or
dispel their suspicions quickly . . . "

Appellant's brief at 8

quoting Lopez 873 P.2d at 1132. However, the Appellant tries to
use that language to justify the fact that Officer Schmidt put
his face into the appellee's vehicle to see if he could smell

6

Although the scope argument was not the ground relied on
by the trial court, this Court may affirm the trial court's
decision on any proper ground. State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 1341,
1344 n. 4 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247
n. 1 (Utah App. 1996).

11

alcohol by arguing that such an act is justified by the fact that
it would quickly confirm the officer's suspicion that there was
an odor of alcohol in the vehicle.7
Just because a desired result can be quickly acquired by a
given course of conduct does not, by itself, justify that course
of conduct.

To hold otherwise would ratify all kinds of

warrantless searches just because of the speed of the desired
result.

This type of "ends justifies the means" argument has

never been the law under the Fourth Amendment.
In addition to the requirement of acting quickly, an officer
also has a requirement in his investigation to use the "least
intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the
officer's suspicion. . ." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500
103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 Led.2d 229 (1983).

The least intrusive

means in this case would have been for the officer simply to
inquire of Mr. Burton if he had been drinking.8
been drinking?
drinks?

How much he had

And at what time he had his first and last

Depending on the answers to those questions, the officer

may have had sufficient reason to ask Mr. Burton to get out of

7

Actually, the Appellant argued that such an action quickly
confirmed the suspicion that Burton was drunk. (Appellant's
brief at 8). The odor of alcohol within a vehicle could not by
itself confirm or dispel the suspicion that Mr. Burton was drunk
but may confirm a hunch that he had been drinking.
8

The officer testified that based on what he could recall,
he asked the appellee if he had been drinking. (Transcript at
15). However, a review of the record fails to shows that any
such question was made prior to the officer putting his face and
head into the passenger compartment of the appellee's vehicle.
(Transcript at 17-18).

12

the vehicle and then proceed with an investigation of driving
under the influence.9
The officer put his face into the passenger compartment of
the appellee's vehicle for the purpose of detecting the odor of
alcohol.

(Transcript at 12).

The Utah Supreme Court in State v.

Schlosserr held that the officer went beyond the scope of the
initial traffic stop by opening the passenger door and scanning
the interior of the cab of a truck.
that such action of the officer
supported by probable cause.

The Utah Supreme Court held

was a search and had to be

774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989).

Schlosser cites to the United States Supreme Court case of New
York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114-115, 106 S.Ct. 960, 966-67, 89
L.Ed.2d 81 (1986), where the Court stated that "a car's interior
as a whole is . . . subject to Fourth Amendment protection from
unreasonable intrusions by the police." In Class, the Court held
that an officer's opening of an automobile door to look at the
vehicle identification number constituted a "search."

475 U.S.

at 114, 119, 106 S.Ct. At 966, 969. An Officer putting his face
and later his head into the passenger compartment of a vehicle

9

Appellant argues that one of the facts that support the
officer's intrusion into the passenger compartment of the
appellee's vehicle is that Mr. Burton volunteered that he was
drunk. Such an argument has no foundation. Nowhere in the
record does Mr. Burton volunteer that he was drunk. Appellant
states this in his Relevant Facts but provides no cite as to
where to find such an admission in the record. Later in the
Appellant's Brief, the Appellant indicates that this admission is
found on the video. However, no such admission is found in the
record for review in this case. The Appellee, therefore,
respectfully requests this court to ignore the ten or more
references in the Appellant's Brief to such an alleged admission.

13

constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.

"In Arizona v.

Hicksr 480 U.S. 321, 325, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 1153, 94 L.Ed.2d 347
(1987), the Supreme Court held that even a small intrusion beyond
the legitimate scope of an initially lawful search is unlawful
under the Fourth Amendment."

Schlosserf 774 P.2d 1132, 1135; See

also State v. Gallegos. 712 P.2d 207 (Utah 1985).

The Schlosser

case cites to cases on point from other jurisdictions.

774 P.2d

at 1136-37. One in particular is Commonwealth Vt Poflgurski, 386
Mass. 385, 436 N.E.2d 150 (1982), cert. Denied, 459 U.S. 1222,
103 S.Ct. 1167, 75 L.Ed.2d 464 (1983), where the Massachusetts
court held that the officer's poking his head inside a slightly
open sliding door required suppression of the evidence.

Another

case on point is People v. Aquinof 119 A.D.2d 464 500 N.Y.S.2d
677, 679 (1986), where the officer did not merely look into the
vehicle from the outside but bent his head into the car to
conduct a visual inspection of what would otherwise be hidden
from plain view.

Such conduct was improper.

Assuming arguendo

Id.

that the trial judge made a correct

holding that an unverified odor of alcohol, that may have been
coming from the street, (transcript at 12) constituted reasonable
suspicion to believe that the appellee was driving under the
influence, the officer still exceeded the scope of that purported
belief by putting his face and head into the passenger
compartment of the appellee's vehicle.

14

III. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRIOR TO THE ILLEGAL
SEARCH TO JUSTIFY THE OFFICER CHANGING THE SCOPE OF THE
INVESTIGATION FROM THAT OF A HEADLIGHT VIOLATION TO
THAT OF AN INVESTIGATION OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF ALCOHOL.
The officer did not have sufficient evidence, independent of
the illegal search to justify an investigation of DUI. For an
officer legally to detain an individual, the United States
Supreme Court has held that the officer must have reasonable
suspicion based on specific and articulable facts "that criminal
activity is afoot."

Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct.

1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

Here, the officer had reasonable

suspicion based on articulable facts that the appellee had
committed the crime of driving without headlights.
After making the stop in this case, the officer was limited
to citing the appellee for driving without his headlights on and
letting him go on his way.

Lopezr 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994).

In

order to be justified in investigating the crime of DUI, he must
have had reasonable suspicion that the crime of DUI had occurred.
Id.

There is no bright line test for determining if reasonable

suspicion exists.
1991).

State v. Stewardf 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App.

Rather, the courts must look at the totality of the

circumstances.

United States? v, SokolPW, 490 U.S. l, 8, 109

S.Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989).
The officer must be able to articulate some unlawful or
suspicious behavior connecting the detainee to the alleged
suspected criminal activity.
19, 21 (Utah App. 1993).

State v. Potterr 224 Utah Adv. Rep.

In the present case, the officer
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approached the appellee's vehicle with a hunch that the appellee
was driving under the influence and even discussed it with his
ride-a-long passenger.

When he approached, he had no evidence

that the appellee was driving under the influence.

There was no

driving pattern to indicate otherwise and when he approached the
appellee he had no other evidence.

The officer requested the

appellee's driver license, registration and insurance
information, and immediately, upon making this request put his
face into the passenger compartment of the vehicle.
The appellant argues that there was enough evidence
available to the officer prior to the illegal search and bases
that argument on two grounds.

First, the appellant argues that

the officer detected the odor of alcohol before he searched the
interior of the appellee's vehicle.

The trial judge erroneously

found that the officer initially smelled the odor of alcohol and
bases that finding on the fact that the officer nodded to the
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passenger.

(Transcript at 32).10

The trial court's finding is

clearly erroneous based on the evidence available to the court.11
The second ground for the Appellant's argument is that the
appellee voluntarily admitted that he was drunk before the
officer inserted his nose or any other portion of his body into
the vehicle.

(Appellant's brief at 10).

As indicated earlier,

the record does not support an allegation that the appellee ever
made the statement that he was drunk.

Furthermore, the record

does show that the only statement made by the appellee prior to
the officer sticking his head into the vehicle was the word
"yeah" in response the officer requesting the appellee's driver

The trial court stated that "it is obvious on the tape,
[that the officer] initially smells the odor of alcohol, just by
the nod and what I previously said." (Transcript at 32) .
However, the nod to the passenger, in confirmation of what they
had discussed, did not occur until after the officer had put his
head inside the passenger compartment of the vehicle.
(Transcript at 18-19). With regards to what the trial court had
"previously said,M a review of the transcript does not indicate
why the trial court made any findings as to when the officer
first detected the odor of alcohol. The closest statement made
by the court is that "[the officer] goes and speaks to Mr.
Burton. He smells the odor of alcohol . . ." (Transcript at 27).
A review of the transcript shows that this finding by the court
is also unsupported by the testimony. (See footnote 3).
11

The Appellant argues that the trial court "specifically
stated that the presence of the odor outside of the vehicle
constituted a reasonable suspicion that Burton was drunk . . . "
(Appellant's brief at 10). The Appellant cites to the transcript
at 34 for that specific statement. With due respect to counsel
for the Appellant, the trial court did not make such a statement.
What the trial court stated is that the officer had "reasonable
articulable suspicion to investigate but not to search, and b y —
by sticking his head into the window, through the window into the
compartment of the car, that's a search. And when you're
searching the car, you need more." (Transcript at 34) .
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license, registration and proof of insurance.

(Transcript at 17-18).

The Appellant argues that it would have obtained the
evidence from the field sobriety tests if no misconduct had
occurred.

(Appellant brief at 11).

such an argument.

The record does not support

"[A] search and seizure without a warrant is

per se unreasonable and . . . the state has the burden to
establish the legality of the search in such a case." State v.
Leef 633 P.2d 48, 65 (Utah 1981).

What the Appellant proved at

the hearing is that the officer could not remember what lead up
to his placing his face inside the window the appellee's vehicle.
The officer made inconsistent statements as to how much
conversation took place before he allegedly smelled the odor of
alcohol.

The officer testified that the appellee spoke with him

several times and during that conversation is when he smelled the
odor of alcohol.

(Transcript at 12).

In later testimony, after a review of the video tape, the
officer testified that the only word spoken to him by the
appellee was "yeah."

(Transcript at 17-18).

When the officer

testifies that he smelled the odor of alcohol before he put his
face in the window, he was not "sure the odor of alcohol was
coming from the car and not on the street or anything right by
there, because it is a heavily traveled road with a lot of
pedestrian traffic and sometimes . . . " (Then the prosecutor
interrupted him)(Transcript at 12).

The officer approached the

vehicle with nothing more that a hunch that the appellee was
driving under the influence.

The officer had discussed with his
18

ride-a-along passenger the o f f i c e r ' s unsupported hunch that the
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have obtained the evidence even had no misconduct h a d taken place
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IV.

THE INVESTIGATION OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
ALCOHOL WHICH OCCURRED AFTER THE ILLEGAL SEARCH WAS NOT
SUFFICIENTLY ATTENUATED FROM THE PRIOR ILLEGALITY TO
JUSTIFY ITS ADMISSIBILITY.

The Appellant, in section III of its brief argues that the
evidence of the field sobriety tests and the arrest of the
appellee should not be suppressed because it was not obtained
from the search.

Such an argument ignores the law of the fruit

of the poisonous tree doctrine and the doctrine of attenuation.
It is apparent from the record that the odor and all
evidence acquired thereafter, stemmed from the illegal search of
the appellee's vehicle.

In addition, the Appellant had the

burden of proving that the consent for the subsequent evidence
was attenuated from the prior illegality.
P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993);

State v. Thurman, 846

State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah

1990). The Appellant presented no evidence that the subsequent
field sobriety tests and acquisition of other evidence was in any
way attenuated from the prior illegal search.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the appellee respectfully
requests that the Court affirm the trial court's ruling granting
the motion to suppress.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of December, 1996.
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